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Scenario No. 1: Suppose that you are an office manager supervising
two other employees in a small business devoted to providing ambulance
transportation to local residents. The business is suddenly raided by nine
federal agents, some of whom are armed and one of whom is wearing a bul-
letproof vest. All of the employees are ordered to congregate in one location
and initially not allowed to leave. The officers then start separately "inter-
viewing" individual employees. One officer, with a prepared, written script
of questions, has been assigned to interview you. Some of the employees
are finally allowed to go to lunch, but carry paging devices with them in
case the officers "need" them. You are never apprised of your Miranda
rights by the federal agent who has engaged you in questioning while your
* The authors are members of the law firm of Perroni, James & House, P.A. located in
Little Rock, Arkansas. The firm's practice is primarily concentrated in the areas of white
collar criminal defense and commercial litigation. In the district court case underlying the
appeal in United States v. Shirley Wallace, (which is discussed at depth in this article), attor-
neys at the firm represented two of Ms. Wallace's codefendants. 323 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir.
2003).
1. This article primarily relates to white collar criminal investigations of individuals
and entities by federal law enforcement officials, and necessarily focuses upon federal law,
practices and procedures. It does not address state authorities, rules, or practices notwith-
standing that most of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights have been held applicable to the
states. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding the Fifth Amendment applicable to the
states). The article also places greater emphasis on cases emanating out of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rather than those from other federal circuits.
Furthermore, this article only applies to investigations of inherently legal busi-
nesses. It was not written envisioning specific application to businesses which have as their
primary focus inherently illegal operations, such as drug houses, houses of prostitution, gam-
bling houses, or those harboring other illicit activities. Finally, for the purpose of this article,
the search warrant is assumed to have been properly issued, valid, and did not facially au-
thorize the detention, arrest, or interrogation of persons.
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fellow employees are away from the business.2 You are subsequently in-
dicted for Medicare fraud, and the federal prosecutors seek to use state-
ments you made to the agent against you as evidence of criminal wrongdo-
ing. Can they really do that? Yes, according to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Shirley Wallace.
3
Scenario No. 2: Suppose that you are a prominent physician who, after
lunch, stops by an adult novelty store to purchase a surprise for your wife.
You have the bad misfortune of being present at the store when it is raided
by federal agents upon suspicions of tax evasion. The officers force all of
the customers to place their hands upon their heads, sit on the floor in the
middle of the store, and then record the identifications of and other details
about each customer. You are never arrested for any crime, but now have
concerns that your name is on some sort of list which could be disseminated
in and throughout the community.4 Can they really do that? Of course they
can. After all, there is no way that you would actually file a complaint or
sue (because of the potential embarrassment involved) and, even if so, under
what legal theory and for what types of damages would you sue?
Scenario No. 3: Suppose that you are an outside insurance broker for a
large insurance company that is raided by law enforcement officers after a
bookkeeper, who was caught embezzling, convinced authorities that other
illegal activity was taking place at the insurance company. During the exe-
cution of a search warrant, you are lined up against the wall with other indi-
viduals at the insurance company, forced to place your hands upon your
head and stare into the barrels of guns being pointed at you, told that you
may not leave, told that you may not make a phone call, and are then inter-
rogated without any mention of your Miranda rights. Criminal charges are
subsequently filed against certain officers of the insurance company, but not
you. 5 Can they really do that? Again, of course they can. You were never
charged with any crime. As a legal matter, what standing do you have to
challenge it? As a practical matter, what are you going to do about it? Re-
gardless of whether a violation of your own rights took place, you were just
happy to eventually leave the premises.
2. As will be discussed, the phrase "Miranda rights" is the popular term used to de-
scribe the various statements that the United States Supreme Court held that law enforcement
officials must make to individuals prior to conducting custodial interrogations. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed." Id.
3. 323 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2003).
4. A somewhat similar situation, loosely based upon these facts, was faced by a profes-
sional acquainted with one of the authors and seeking legal advice.
5. This is another incident which actually transpired and about which one of the au-
thors was informed after its occurrence.
2004]
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Scenario No.4: Suppose that you are a mail room employee of a bank
and are summoned to the institution by bank inspectors who are investigat-
ing the disappearance of various pieces of mail. You are interrogated in the
bank president's office for an hour and a half and make various incriminat-
ing statements prior to being read your Miranda rights. During the question-
ing you are seated between two government inspectors, facing the presi-
dent's desk at which a bank security officer is seated. You are not told that
you are free to leave or that you do not have to answer questions. The bank
inspectors eventually inform you that they are investigating the disappear-
ance of Canadian money and ask if they can look in your wallet. You com-
ply with the request and the agents discover $63.00 in Canadian currency
and a bearer check, both of which constitute marked items that the inspec-
tors had placed in the mail trays. After the agents explain this to you, you
make various incriminating statements before being warned of your
Miranda rights. You then write a statement admitting guilt. You are not
arrested and are allowed to go home after the interview. However, you are
later arrested and charged with a crime. Can they really do that? Surpris-
ingly, the Court said "no" in United States v. Carter6 and suppressed the
statements in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
B. Observations of Problems Presented in Such Instances
The authors of this article are increasingly being confronted with sce-
narios in white collar criminal cases in which targets of investigations, em-
ployees, and occupiers of legitimate businesses are interrogated by federal
agents during the execution of valid search warrants. More often than not,
these interrogations are conducted at the request of, or with the knowledge
of, Assistant United States Attorneys working with federal agents on a case.
Most, if not all, of the documents and things that constituted the subjects of
the search could have been obtained via grand jury subpoenas.7 In the latter
6. 884 F.2d 368-370 (8th Cir. 1989). Note that Carter, like the overwhelming majority
of custodial interrogation cases, did not involve an interrogation in connection with a search
warrant.
7. Federal agents and other government officers may perhaps contend that searches
and seizures are necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. If this is so, why are search
warrants used in some cases and not others? In this day and age of computers, facsimile
machines, electronic mail, and high-speed copiers, it is increasingly difficult to completely
destroy or hide evidence such as business records. Moreover, many of the records typically
seized in federal white collar criminal investigations are required to be maintained (or in
practice are maintained) for varying time periods, e.g., tax records, Medicare and Medicaid
billings, banking records, and numerous other records utilized in various trades and indus-
tries. Because so many white collar criminal cases involve the prosecution of regulated indi-
viduals and entities, many of the documents which are sought to be introduced into evidence
by the prosecution were once previously submitted by the prosecuted individuals and entities
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scenario, however, the subjects of the search had an opportunity to consult
with legal counsel. In the former scenario, the agents on the case enjoyed a
golden opportunity to use the guise of executing a search warrant to im-
properly conduct custodial interrogations. 8
With few exceptions, the only time the legality of an interrogation
arises is when the person being interrogated has been indicted for a crime.
As a practical matter, forced "in-custody" interrogations of individuals who
are not indicted will rarely come before the courts for several reasons. First,
civil suits for wrongful interrogations are rare and not generally successful.9
Second, in a criminal setting, even if the forced in-custody interrogation of
an employee is legally improper, generally only the person who makes the
improperly obtained confession has standing to challenge its validity.'0 As a
result, many abuses are never meaningfully addressed. The issue is thus left
for debate by academics and authors of law review articles.
The government's typical argument is that the officials were legally on
the premises pursuant to a lawfully issued search warrant that authorized a
search of the premises. Further, the government will typically contend that
the target, employee, or occupant was not legally compelled to answer ques-
tions, but actually voluntarily submitted to the answering of questions (or
even initiated the exchange). The authors submit that these arguments ig-
nore the totality of the circumstances, i.e., the reality of the scene at the time
of the interrogations, as well as the fact that the search warrants typically
convey no express or implied authority to conduct interrogations.
When executing a search warrant, law enforcement officials have lim-
ited authority to enter and take control of premises via the temporary deten-
tion of individuals at the scene." Whether in a business or in a home, these
detentions-which more often than not "ripen" into interrogations-are
serious intrusions which should be strictly curtailed under the Bill of
to the government (e.g., to receive payment for services rendered to a governmental benefici-
ary, as evidence of regulatory compliance, etc.) and hence were already in the government's
possession prior to the search taking place.
8. It is the authors' experience that the government all too often tends to label such
encounters as mere "interviews." More often than not, however, such "interviews" result in
compelled confessions or coerced admissions which often serve as the backbone of a prose-
cution's case-in-chief.
9. See Hampton v. Gilmore, 60 F.R.D. 71, 80-81 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd without op.,
(8th Cir. 1973) (holding that officer's failure to give plaintiff Miranda warnings prior to
questioning did not form basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); but see Warren v. City
of Lincoln, Neb., 816 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that trial court erred in
dismissing civil rights action brought by arrestee against city because testimony at trial put
into issue question of whether police department failed to properly train officers, resulting in
wrongful interrogation of arrestee).
10. See Salvucci v. United States, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980);Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
11. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
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Rights. 12 To allow officers to exceed the limited scope of the search warrant
and occupy legitimate businesses-not for the sole purpose of executing the
search warrant, but also for the unstated purpose of improperly interrogating
individuals under the guise of merely executing the search warrant-is a
gross abuse of power and a constitutional violation. Employers, who are
likely initial targets of the investigation and later defendants, lose control
not only of their businesses, but also of their personnel for this often ex-
tended period of time. Regardless of whether the employer is a business or
an individual, the employer will generally have no standing to object to in-
terrogations of third persons, such as employees, during this period of
time. 13 Paradoxically, these employees typically remain on the employer's
payroll during the periods of these searches and, in some instances, may be
able to bind their employers with damaging admissions.14
In these situations, law enforcement officials have created custodial in-
terrogation situations for those persons unfortunate and unlucky enough to
be present on the premises at the time of a search. Typically, these persons
are not free to leave and are restrained for a period of time. During this cus-
todial period, targets, employees, and occupants alike are interrogated as
part of the officers' execution of the search warrants, albeit such interroga-
tions are not envisioned by the warrant or in the affidavit supporting the
warrant. Courts should recognize the custodial nature of these interrogations
and afford these individuals the full protections granted to them under the
United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, Miranda, and its progeny.
II. SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. The Fourth Amendment
One of the cornerstones of the Bill of Rights is the Fourth Amendment,
which addresses unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no [w]arrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
[o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1
5
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966) (holding that "The current prac-
tice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished
principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself').
13. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72; Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)-(E).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The plain language of the Fourth Amendment itself reflects that its ap-
plicability extends both to searches and seizures of property, as well as sei-
zures, i.e., arrests, of persons. Accordingly, a warrant will usually be re-
quired before a search or seizure may take place unless "exigent circum-
stances" (such as imminent destruction of evidence, possible harm to per-
sons, searching in "hot pursuit" for a subject, etc.) exist.'
6
When a search warrant is issued to a law enforcement officer, the
Fourth Amendment explicitly states that it may only be issued after a show-
ing of "probable cause.' 17 The Fourth Amendment itself does not generally
require that a search or seizure conducted without a warrant occur only
upon a showing of "probable cause" (i.e., a "stop and frisk" may occur
when a law enforcement officer possesses a mere "reasonable suspicion").1
8
However, the case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment has generally
imposed such a requirement. 19 Whether or not a search or arrest warrant is
issued upon probable cause in a given instance, the actual search or arrest
must not be "unreasonable" in nature.20 "[T]he Fourth Amendment governs
all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and [makes]
the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the experiences of the
case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.'
A search or seizure envisioned by the Fourth Amendment occurs only
when a "reasonable expectation of privacy" possessed by a person has been
violated.22 Reasonableness is determined "by balancing the need to search
[or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails. '23 A
16. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
17. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c). Probable cause exists when "the facts and circum-
stances within their [the agents'] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information... [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that..." a crime has or is being committed, and property subject to seizure can be
found on the person or at the place to be searched. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
161-162 (1925). A full exploration of the doctrine of "probable cause" is beyond the scope
of this article.
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
19. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches not con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant are presumed unreasonable unless they fall into certain excep-
tions, e.g., search incident to arrest).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
22. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam) (finding that "[t]he touchstone of our analysis under
the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particu-
lar governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."'); Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1967).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967));
see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001) (stating that "[R]ather than employ-
ing a per se rule of unreasonableness [in this case], we balance the privacy-related and law
2004]
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"reasonable expectation of privacy only exists when a person (1) possesses
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and (2) such expectation is one
that society recognizes as being "reasonable. 24
Deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement offi-
cers is the primary purpose of the "exclusionary rule., 25 The exclusionary
rule prohibits the prosecution's admission of physical and testimonial evi-
dence that was illegally gathered in violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights.26 In certain circumstances, the evidence can be introduced despite
legal deficiencies. 27 The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, while not
restricted solely to Fourth Amendment applications, may also be utilized to
exclude evidence upon demonstration of a Fourth Amendment violation and
it precludes introduction of indirect or derivative "fruits" of an earlier viola-
tion of one's rights.28
B. The Fifth Amendment
1. General Principles
Just as the Fourth Amendment provides significant protections to those
who are direct or indirect targets of government intrusion, the Fifth
enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable").
24. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
25. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 (1976). See also United States v. Fletcher,
91 F.3d 48, 52 (8th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1174 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The exclusionary rule is a judicially
created doctrine designed to prevent the gathering of evidence in violation of the United
States Constitution by law enforcement officers. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741
(1979). However, the rule is not triggered when evidence has been collected in violation of
administrative regulations. Id. at 751-52. The full extent and scope of the exclusionary rule
is beyond the scope of this article.
26. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). Theoretically, other remedies
are available (e.g., criminal prosecution of the law enforcement officer; the institution of a
tort action against a law enforcement officer, law enforcement entity, municipality or state).
Rollins v. Farmer, 731 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1984). Dismissal of all charges where there is
demonstrable prejudice or a substantial threat thereof to the defendant, is also a remedy.
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that a warrant
suffering from technical problems will not necessitate suppression if the law enforcement
authorities acted in good faith). Of course, the introduction of the evidence, even for a differ-
ent stated purpose, undoubtedly has an effect on the jury who hears or sees it and the defen-
dant who is prejudiced by it.
28. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (citing Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). The foregoing discussion of the Fourth Amendment has been pro-
vided to generally acquaint the reader with certain principles necessary for understanding the
topic of this article. The sheer scope of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence necessarily limits
the depth of such discussion and the reader is warned that numerous qualifications exist with
respect to each legal principle.
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Amendment provides in pertinent part that "no person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ... 29 "These
precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of perse-
cution and struggle." 30 "We sometimes forget how long it has taken to es-
tablish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it
came and the fervor with which it was defended."'', The authors submit that
one such instance in which the privilege has been forgotten (or ignored) is
when federal law enforcement officials conduct custodial interrogations of
targets, employees, and occupants of a legitimate business under the pretext
of merely executing a search warrant at that business.
The Fifth Amendment is especially relevant with respect to the balance
between law enforcement interrogation of suspects as an effective means of
fighting crime and the societal interest in protecting individuals against abu-
sive police tactics.32 The restraints society must observe consistent with the
United States Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime go "to the
roots of our concepts of American jurisprudence."33
This tension was exemplified in Escobedo v. Illinois,34 wherein Justice
Goldberg, writing for a majority of the Court, wrote that "a system of crimi-
nal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful inves-
tigation. 3 6 However, in dissent, Justice White argued that hindering law
enforcement's use of confessions will cripple law enforcement and result in
"its task [being] made a great deal more difficult... for unsound, unstated
reasons, which can find no home in the provisions of the Constitution. 35
2. Miranda v. Arizona
Since the mid-1960's, the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona36 has
governed the use of confessions in federal and state proceedings. It requires
that, as a procedural safeguard, an individual must be warned about his
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1965).
31. Id.at 458.
32. See id. at 479. Miranda states that:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation
outweighs the privilege.... [T]he Constitution has prescribed the rights of the
individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in
the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
33. Id. at 439.
34. 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
35. Id. at 499.
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
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rights, inclusive of his privilege against self-incrimination, before "an indi-
vidual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by au-
thorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning." Before
Miranda is triggered, however, three requirements must be satisfied: (1) the
person must have been taken into "custody," (2) a confession must have
resulted from "interrogation," and (3) the custody and interrogation must
have been initiated and conducted by law enforcement authorities.37 Once
Miranda is triggered the suspect's Miranda warnings must be given.38
A corollary of the above principles is that statements obtained from a
suspect in violation of the Miranda rules will be precluded from being ad-
mitted by the prosecution against the suspect in a criminal proceeding.39
Miranda clearly relies upon the Fifth Amendment as the foundation for its
holding to the extent that it correctly recognizes custodial interrogations as
being inherently coercive and likely to compel confessions against the Fifth
Amendment's clear intent.4 °
It is well-established that once a suspect is given his Miranda rights,
these rights may be exercised at any point during the questioning where-
upon such questioning must immediately cease. 4' These rights may also be
waived; however, such a waiver will only be effective if knowingly and
intelligently made.42
3. "Custody" and "Interrogation"
The issues of what constitutes "custody" and what constitutes an "in-
terrogation" bear special attention because they are primary issues arising in
situations wherein federal law enforcement officials pretextually use search
warrants in white collar criminal investigations of legitimate businesses to
conduct questioning of targets, employees, and occupants.43 Under Miranda
37. See id. at 478-79.
38. Id. at 444-45. These warnings include: (1) the "right to remain silent," (2) the fact
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) "the right to the presence
of an attorney," and (4) the fact that if he cannot afford an attorney, one may be appointed for
him prior to any questioning.
39. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974).
40. Id. at 458 (holding that "no statement obtained from [a] defendant [in custody] can
truly be the product of his free choice"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)
(finding that an interrogation of one in custody threatens the exercise of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege because custodial interrogation is "inherently coercive").
41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
42. Id. at 475. As with the previous discussion of the Fourth Amendment, the body of
jurisprudence dealing with the Fifth Amendment is extensive such that in-depth discussion of
individual topics like the Miranda warnings themselves, their invocation, and their waiver
are beyond the scope of this article.
43. Miranda applies without regard to the seriousness of the crime involved or the se-
verity of the sentence at issue. In other words, if a custodial interrogation takes place,
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and its progeny, "custody" exists under any circumstances where the sus-
44pect is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As "the formality of an arrest is not a prerequisite to a finding of cus-
todial interrogation," we strongly submit that courts are drastically underes-
timating the "custodial" nature of detentions carried out during the course of
executions of searches of legitimate businesses. In doing so, these courts are
ignoring serious violations of individuals' Fifth Amendment rights to not be
compelled as witnesses against themselves.45
For the purposes of Miranda, an "interrogation" occurs "whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent" including "any words or actions on the part of the police ...
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 'A 6 Courts have inter-
preted this to mean that no Miranda warnings need be given if law en-
forcement officials do not interact with the suspect but instead merely create
a situation, or allow a situation to develop, wherein the suspect makes an
incriminating statement.47 Likewise, purely volunteered statements such as
the spontaneous utterance of an incriminating statement without being ques-
tioned, do not trigger Miranda.48
Miranda warnings must first be given even if the suspect is charged with a minor traffic
infraction with no possibility of imprisonment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434-35
(1984).
44. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990) citing Miranda, 384
U.S. at 44; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429).
In determining whether a suspect is "in custody" at a particular time we examine
the extent of the physical or psychological restraints placed on the suspect dur-
ing the interrogation in light of whether a "reasonable person in the suspect's po-
sition would have understood his situation" to be one of custody.
Id. at 1347 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370
(8th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating
that custody "implies a situation in which the suspect knows he is speaking with a govern-
ment agent and does not feel free to the conversation; the essential element of a custodial
interrogation is coercion").
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime -
"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
45. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1347 n.3 (reversing conviction).
46. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
47. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1989) (stating in a 5-4 decision that no
interrogation found where police set up meeting between husband and wife wherein husband
made an incriminating statement).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (holding that "[violunteered statements of any kind are




As stated above, interrogation includes not only express questioning
but also conduct by law enforcement agents which amounts to the "func-
tional equivalent" of questioning.49 Conduct is the functional equivalent of
questioning when agents use words or actions that they should know are
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect." 50 The
primary focus of this inquiry is not on the intent of the officers, but on the
perceptions of the suspect.51 This focus reflects the basic constitutional con-
cems addressed in Miranda: the Fifth Amendment protection against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. 52 The issue is not whether the police believe that
certain actions might illicit a statement from a suspect, but whether a sus-
pect would perceive such actions as requiring or requesting a response.53
Courts have wrestled with the question of what is an interrogation.
Certainly not every question is an interrogation. Many sorts of questions
do not, by their very nature, involve the psychological intimidation that
Miranda is designed to prevent. A definition of interrogation that in-
cludes any question posed by a police officer would be broader than that
required to implement the policy of Miranda itself.54
However, courts have also recognized:
[t]he potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under
the guise of seeking "objective" or "neutral" information, deliberately
elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect. Thus we emphasize that
... for whether questioning constitutes interrogation is whether, in light
of all the circumstances, the police should have known that a question
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.55
Ordinarily, the routine gathering of background biographical data will
not constitute interrogation. 6 Thus, while a detention might be permissible
for purposes of conducting a search, it is not permissible for the purpose of
asking questions designed to elicit incriminating statements. 7
49. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.
50. Id. at 301.
51. See id. Nevertheless, the officers' intent is not irrelevant because it bears on whether
they should have known that particular conduct was likely to evoke an incriminating re-
sponse. Id.
52. Mauro, 481 U.S. at 526.
53. Id. at 526-27.
54. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Innis, 446 U.S.
at 301).
55. Id at 1238 (emphasis added).
56. See United States ex rel. Hines v. La Vallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir.
1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). See also United States v. Lamonica, 472 F.2d 580,
581 (9th Cir. 1972) (inventory of suspect's belongings).
57. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 n.15 (1981); Dunaway v. New York,
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Combining the concepts of "custody" and "interrogation," the Supreme
Court has defined a "custodial interrogation" as "questioning by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. '58 "Thus, a suspect
must be both in custody and subject to interrogation to trigger the Miranda
warnings requirement. 59
C. Conflict Between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
When appearing before judges and magistrates to justify their requests
for search warrants, law enforcement officers are typically not required to
justify their plans in connection with interrogation of individuals located at
the scene. 60 Indeed, officers may have a specific plan to detain and interro-
gate individuals and withhold these facts from the magistrate who issues the
search warrant.61
While there are numerous cases generally discussing the Miranda fac-
tors and addressing the issue of whether a person is deemed to be the sub-
ject of a custodial interrogation, we have discovered few reported cases
from the federal courts of appeals (at least from the facts stated in those
decisions) in which federal agents patently used the pretext of a valid search
warrant to conduct custodial interrogations of occupants of a legitimate
business.62 Many of the general Miranda cases are therefore sui generis to
442 U.S. 200 (1979); See also United States v. Morales, 611 F. Supp. 242, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), reversed on other grounds, 788 F.2d 883 (1986) (holding that "we focused primarily
upon perceptions of the defendant rather than the intent of the police") (quoting Innis, 446
U.S. at 301).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
59. United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1159 (7th Cir. 1998). See United States v.
Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that custody is a prerequisite for deter-
mining whether an interrogation occurred).
60. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. As discussed, officers are only required
to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
61. The authors suggest that in connection with a search of a legitimate business, the
officers have a duty to disclose these plans to a magistrate because the search warrant gener-
ally only gives the officers the right to search and seize items on the premises, not the right to
conduct interrogations.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 2003) (search
of ambulance transportation company in Medicare fraud investigation). A few other cases
contain somewhat similar fact scenarios or emanate from other federal circuits. United States
v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's admission of statements
made by defendants during the search of their electronics business for illegal cable television
devices); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1499-50 (6th Cir. 1986) (search of a medi-
cal clinic in investigation of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances through medical
clinic and mail fraud violations. See also United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496 (8th Cir.
2002) (statements made at suspect's home during execution of a search warrant in a child
pornography investigation). Of course, the fact that there may be relatively few reported
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this specific scenario. In some scenarios, law enforcement officers have
been entrusted with a search warrant for a specific purpose (e.g., a search
warrant authorizing the seizure of records) but have utilized it for a purpose
other than that which was authorized (e.g., to conduct custodial interroga-
tions of targets, employees, and occupants of legitimate businesses).63 An
obvious conflict thus arises between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth
Amendment, to the extent that properly securing a search warrant pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment is being used to improperly compel incriminating
statements from individuals present during the execution of that search war-
rant in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 64
That said, numerous courts of appeals have ruled that, based on the
facts of the case, officers executing search warrants were not required to
give Miranda warnings to persons merely being detained during the search
before questioning occurs because this questioning is normally non-
custodial in nature.65 With the exception of Wallace, however, none of these
cases dealt with interrogations conducted during the search of a legitimate
business for its business records.
cases containing such facts does not necessarily mean that it is not a common occurrence.
63. See discussion supra Part 1.
64. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) ("A person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.") (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); United States v.
Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1159 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that "[w]hen reviewing a district
court's determination regarding the question of whether a suspect was in custody, this court
has repeatedly directed that the trial judge make a specific finding as to "freedom to leave" in
the Fourth Amendment context"); United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1994)
(finding that the defendant's "detention, pursuant to the search warrant, was a reasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); but see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 653, 657 (1961)
(stating that "[t]he philosophy of [the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] and of each freedom is
complementary .... ").
65. See, e.g., Wallace, 323 F. 3d at 1113-14; Axsom, 289 F.3d at 500-01 (upholding a
search of a suspect's home for child pornography); United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152,
1155-1160 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a search warrant of a home for destruction devices);
Crawford, 52 F.3d at 1304 (affirming district court's admission of statements made by de-
fendant during the search of their electronics business for illegal cable television devices);
Burns, 37 F.3d at 280-81 (affirming district court's denial of a motion to suppress as to
statements made during execution of a search warrant for cocaine at defendant's hotel room);
United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding a detention of a
suspect at his home during execution of a search warrant for evidence concerning an armed
robbery); United States v. Richmann, 860 F.2d 837, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming a
search of a suspected drug dealer's office; suspect advised of his Miranda rights); United
States v. Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 755-57 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a search of a suspect's
office for stolen property). See also United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court's refusal to suppress statements made during a warrantless search of
a car shop for cocaine).
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The conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments arising in the
context of this article's envisioned factual scenario is best exemplified by
66 67Michigan v. Summers6 6 and its progeny, wherein an exception has been
created to allow the temporary detention or seizure of individuals during
searches.
The exception has been allowed to vitiate one of our most time hon-
ored rights-personal freedom:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
68
The authors submit that, when executing search warrants, it is the
agents rather than the legitimate businesses who control when the search
takes place (e.g., during peak business hours, when the maximum number of
employees are present or when the business is closed). This control creates
an environment for exploitive and pretextual interrogations.
While there may be valid reasons for the Summers exceptions, the jus-
tifications for these detentions or seizures, which are undoubtedly custodial
in nature, simply do not apply to the search of legitimate businesses for
business records. Further, even if a detention or seizure may be proper un-
der the Fourth Amendment, it does not follow as a fortiori that such facts
should automatically create an exception under the Fifth Amendment. Un-
der Miranda, custody is custody and its protections should apply regardless
of the validity of the underlying seizure.
66. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
67. See discussion infra Part III.A.2-3.
68. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
III. EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS FOR THE PRETEXTUAL PURPOSE
OF CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA
A. Execution of Search Warrants
69
1. General
In the event that law enforcement authorities execute a search warrant,
circumstances may arise in which they desire to search individuals present
at the premises. If the officials develop probable cause to arrest someone on
the premises, then they, of course, may arrest the person and conduct a valid
search incident to arrest.7° In the absence of probable cause to arrest upon
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, law enforcement officials may search the
person if they have probable cause to believe that the person possesses
items which are named in the search warrant. 71 Absent probable cause to
arrest or to search a person for items named in a search warrant, a person
merely present on the premises of a location being searched may not be
personally searched if the person does not appear to be connected to the
suspected criminal activity.72
2. Michigan v. Summers
73
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
when executing search warrants, the initial rounding up and temporary de-
tention (as opposed to searches) of some individuals is justified under the
Fourth Amendment.74 The Court reasoned that "[t]he intrusiveness of de-
taining an occupant of the premises being searched [is] outweighed by the
law enforcement interest in: (1) preventing flight; (2) minimizing the risk of
harm to officers; and (3) conducting an orderly search. ' '75 Specifically,
69. Again, the authors are assuming for the purposes of this article that the search war-
rant was properly issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, supported by an affidavit
establishing probable cause, and contained a particular description of the premises to be
searched and the things to be seized, but did not specifically authorize the detention of indi-
viduals for the purpose of interrogating them.
70. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
71. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
72. Id. at 91 ("[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person...
. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by
probable cause particularized with respect to that person.").
73. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
74. See id. at 705 (holding that "a warrant to search ... founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted").
75. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 778 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Summers, 452
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courts have held that officers executing search warrants have the right to
secure the premises to be searched, both to assure their own safety and to
guard against the destruction of evidence.76
3. Limitations on Detentions and Interrogations
The authority of officers in executing search warrants is not without
limit. The Summers Court expressly reserved the question of whether deten-
tion would be justified if the search warrant authorized the seizure of evi-
dence, rather than contraband." Courts have also held that law enforcement
officers cannot seize a person at another location and bring him to the site of
the execution of the search warrant pursuant to Summers. 8 In United States
v. Reinholz 79 the Eighth Circuit reasoned that an arrest in such a situation
cannot be justified as a legitimate detention of an occupant of the premises
to be searched. As discussed in detail infra, a careful analysis of the Sum-
mers decision clearly establishes that it does not justify the detaining and
interrogation of targets, employees, and interrogation of legitimate busi-
nesses while executing search warrants absent first informing such indi-
viduals of their Miranda rights.
In determining the reasonableness of detentions and interrogations,
courts often look at the duration of the detention. There is a fundamental
difference between targets of a search and mere occupants of property
which is being searched.
Persons being arrested are ordinarily suspected of having committed se-
rious, often violent, offenses. Persons being detained while a search of
the house is being conducted may simply be visiting a home or business
for an innocuous if not benevolent purpose. A detention conducted in
connection with a search may be unreasonable if it is unnecessarily pain-
U.S. at 701-03). See also United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994). The
authors submit that these interests are rarely actually triggered in the context of most federal,
white collar criminal investigations of legitimate businesses. Because they are not typically
triggered, these interests should no longer be deemed to outweigh the intrusiveness of detain-
ing individuals present at the scene.
76. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d at 502-03 (8th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997).
77. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.20; United States v. Rowe, 694 F. Supp. 1420, 1423
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
78. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 39 U.S. 1, 18 (1968) (stating that "a search which is reason-
able at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity
and scope")
79. Reinholz, 245 F.3d at 777-78.
2004)
UALR LAW REVIEW
ful, degrading, or prolonged, or if it involves an undue invasion of pri-
80vacy.
B. Consequences of Custodial Interrogations During Executions of Search
Warrants
If the individual who is wrongfully interrogated during the execution
of a search warrant is never charged with any criminal wrongdoing, it is
highly unlikely (as a practical matter) that the law enforcement officer's
actions will ever be reviewed by the courts. This is because there typically
will not be a criminal proceeding in which the custody issues will be raised,
unless someone else involved in the investigation was charged instead. Even
in that event, however, the focus of any court hearing will be upon viola-
tions of the defendant's constitutional rights, not those of the one who was
never charged.8'
Further, civil liability will likely not be imposed upon the law en-
forcement officers, regardless of how egregious their actions were in con-
80. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (stating that "[w]e have never ap-
proved a seizure of the person [without probable cause] for the prolonged 90-minute period
involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case"); Levito v. Lapina, 258
F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that detention of taxpayer and his wife during 8 hour search
of business violated Fourth Amendment); United States v. Rodriguez, 68 F. Supp. 2d 104,
110 (D. Puerto Rico 1999) ("[d]efendant's detention and handcuffs during the close to three
hours that the search lasted was unreasonably prolonged, especially after the agents had
secured the premises and ascertained that Defendant was not armed"); Franklin v. Foxworth,
31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the trial court erroneously concluded that the
manner of execution of search warrant was reasonable where disabled occupant of residence
to be searched was removed from his sick bed in a semi-naked state and forced to remain so
in full view of twenty-three armed strangers); Renalde v. City and County of Denver, 807 F.
Supp. 668, 672 (D. Colo. 1992) (handcuffing defendant and making him lie face-down on the
floor for a prolonged period of time, even after initial sweep of his residence pursuant to a
search warrant had revealed no weapons, held unreasonable and outside the scope of Sum-
mers); Daniel v. Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1405 (11 th Cir. 1986) (holding that law enforcement
officers who detained plaintiff for two hours and forty-five minutes without probable cause
while searching a business for business records were entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of plaintiff); United States v.
Timpani, 665 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that forty-five minute detention during search
not unreasonable); id. 2-3 (making defendant remain with agents and refusing to allow him
to telephone his lawyer during the first forty-five minutes of a five-hour search for contra-
band at his house, in order to minimize the risk of sudden violence or frantic efforts to con-
ceal or destroy evidence, was permissible under Summers); People v. Gabriel, 188 Cal. App.
3d 1261 (Ct. App. Cal. 1986) (upholding a ruling that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated because of his one and one-half to two hour detention during execution of
valid search warrant); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995) (rec-
ognizing that prolonged detention may ripen into an arrest).
81. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1960).
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ducting the wrongful interrogation. While a civil action theoretically could
follow under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such actions are few and far between. There
are relatively few cases in which these reported actions have been filed re-
lating to a wrongful custodial interrogation in violation of an individual's
Fifth Amendment rights.82 Of these types of cases, leave to proceed to trial
83was granted in only a handful of these matters.
For instance, on May 27, 2003, in Chavez v. Martinez,84 the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of a district
court's ruling that an individual had stated a § 1983 claim against a police
sergeant who had subjected him to a coercive interrogation after he had
been shot by another police officer. A translation of the tape-recorded ques-
tioning in Spanish that had occurred revealed that the individual was in ex-
treme pain, was being treated by medical personnel during the interrogation,
and desired that the questioning cease. 85 The Court held that the law en-
forcement officer's failure to read Miranda warnings to the individual did
not violate his constitutional rights nor constitute grounds for a § 1983 ac-
tion.86 Because he was never prosecuted for a crime and was never com-
pelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case, he could not allege
a violation of any Fifth Amendment right.87 The Court's opinion also noted
that a failure to read one's Miranda rights, resulting in application of the
exclusionary rule, does not constitute any "right" which has been violated
but itself is only a "prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right
protected by the text of the [Fifth Amendment's] Self-Incrimination
Clause].], 88 Justice Souter, in an opinion concurring in the judgment ren-
dered by Judge Thomas' opinion, noted however that "[t]he question
whether the absence of Miranda warnings may be a basis for a § 1983 ac-
tion under any circumstance is not before the Court.,
89
82. See, e.g., Neighbour v. Cove, 68 F.3d 1508 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that violation of
Miranda rights would not form a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Warren v. Lin-
coln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that alleged Miranda violation not action-
able under § 1983).
83. See, e.g., Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that alleged coer-
cion of incriminating statement from suspect during custodial interrogation was actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 though statement was not introduced at trial); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963
F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that cause of action was stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
wherein police interrogated him following improper advisement of Miranda rights, clear and
unequivocal request to contact attorney, and use of psychological pressure to try and coerce
confession).
84. 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
85. Id.at2010-11.
86. Id. at 2004.
87. Id. at 2000. See also U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("[N]o person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
88. Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004.
89. Id. at 2007 (emphasis added).
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, even if a detention is found to violate the Fourth
Amendment, individual liability to agents does not necessarily result. In
Levito v. Lapino,90 the Court held that the agent's detention of a taxpayer
and his wife while search warrants were being executed violated the Fourth
Amendment, but that the I.R.S. agents enjoyed qualified immunity as to all
claims. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."91 The doctrine of qualified immunity "provides ample protection to
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law., 92 If
the law is not clearly established (and it rarely is in Fourth Amendment
cases) or a reasonable official could have believed the actions to be lawful,
the official is entitled to immunity.93
Again, if the individual is charged with a crime, the best the defendant
can usually hope for is that the evidence will be suppressed pursuant to the
exclusionary rule or "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, discussed in de-
tail supra.94 Moreover, illegally-obtained evidence may nonetheless be used
for some purposes, such as to impeach a defendant's trial testimony, al-
though it cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief,95 or be intro-
duced against the defendant in a grand jury proceeding such as in U.S. v.
Calandra. 
96
Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct. Thus its major thrust is a deterrent
one and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to po-
lice misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitu-
90. 258 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2001)
91. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The full extent of qualified immu-
nity is beyond the scope of this article.
92. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
93. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Kames v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 492-94 (3d
Cir. 1995).
94. But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (establishing a "good faith" excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
(recognizing an "inevitable discovery" exception if evidence would have been discovered by
other police techniques, as well as an "independent source" exception which applies when
law enforcement officials have two manners in which to procure evidence and only one is
illegal); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (recognizing "purged taint"
exception wherein intervening events and factors between original illegality and discovered
evidence render the link too tenuous to warrant application of exclusionary rule).
95. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
96. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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tional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a
mere "form of words."
97
IV. INDICIA OF WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL IS "IN CUSTODY" FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER MIRANDA IS IMPLICATED
A. Standard of Review-the Griffin Indicia & the Objective "Reasonable
Suspect" Test
As discussed above, the Miranda doctrine only applies when an inter-
rogation of an individual is "custodial" in nature. 98 In United States v. Grif
fin,99 the Eighth Circuit developed a non-exhaustive list of six common in-
dicia used to determine whether an individual is in custody. These factors,
collectively and commonly referred to as the "Griffin test," include:
(1) [w]hether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that
the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or
[could] request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not consid-
ered under arrest;
(2) [w]hether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement
during questioning;
(3) [w]hether the suspect initiated contact with the authorities or volun-
tarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions;
(4) [w]hether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed
during the questioning;
(5) [w]hether the atmosphere of questioning was police dominated; [and]
(6) [w]hether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of
the questioning. 1°
"[I]n order to determine what constitutes custody for purposes of requiring
Miranda warnings prior to questioning of an individual, one must look at
the totality of the circumstances involved."'
0'1
97. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (citations omitted).
98. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.").
99. 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990). As with most custodial interrogation cases,
Griffin did not involve an interrogation in connection with a search warrant. Accordingly,
Griffin and its progeny are not dispositive with respect to the specific issues raised and sce-
narios envisioned in this article. See id.
100. Id. at 1349; United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2002).
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In applying the foregoing six indicia, the trial court is to conduct a bal-
ancing of the factors. 0 2 The determination is objective and the evaluation is
conducted from the perspective of a "reasonable suspect."'0 3 Stated differ-
ently, the question is whether or not a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would have believed that he was or was not in custody at that in-
stant. 104 "An objective, reasonable person test is necessary to avoid (1) be-
ing dependent upon self-serving declarations of agents and of the defendant,
and (2) placing the burden upon the agents to anticipate the frailties and
idiosyncrasies of every person they question."'' 0 5 At least to most federal
courts, the suspect's own subjective belief that he was not free to leave the
encounter-as well as the law enforcement officer's own subjective intent
to hold the suspect against his will-are deemed to be irrelevant. 1
06
The objective "reasonable suspect" test obviously means that some-
times a custodial interrogation can be found, or not be found, regardless of
the officer's subjective intention whether or not to hold the person. For ex-
ample, if an officer has subjectively elected not to hold a suspect in custody,
or has not yet decided whether the suspect being questioned is a serious-
enough target to justify holding him, that subjective belief has been deemed
irrelevant as to the issue of whether a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would have believed that he was not free to leave. This was the
scenario in Stansbury v. California,'0 7 wherein the Court held for the defen-
dant, remanded the case for a determination based upon the objective "rea-
sonable suspect" test, and observed that:
[A]n officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the
person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment
101. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that the conclu-
sion concerning custody must arise from an examination of the totality of the circumstances)
(citing United States v. Lanier, 838 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1988)) (per curiam); United
States v. Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1984).
102. Axsom, 289 F.3d at 501.
103. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
104. Id.
105. United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 442 n.35). In Wallace, which involved an employee who worked for an ambulance
service in the Jonesboro, Arkansas area, the Eighth Circuit found that a Federal Bureau of
Investigation raid and interrogation on the one-year anniversary of the infamous Jonesboro-
area school shootings did not militate in favor of converting her non-custodial questioning
into a custodial encounter. Id.
106. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. Some federal courts have held, however, that although
the subjective views of the officers and the suspect in custody are not determinative, they are
"certainly relevant." See, e.g., United States v. Ceballos, 2003 WL 21347194, (D. Neb.
2003). The Ceballos court stated that if the defendant considered the fire station interrogation
to constitute an "arrest," "then the defendant's belief that the officers had taken him into
custody and that he was not free to leave could be credited as reasonable." Id. at fn. 1.
107. 511 U.S. 318,442 (1994).
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whether the person is in custody .... [A]n officer's view concerning the
nature of an investigation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability
of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that
bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but
only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the
individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable
person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.
8
Likewise, in the event that a law enforcement officer subjectively in-
tends to hold the defendant as a serious suspect, so long as that intention is
never disclosed by the officer to the defendant and a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would have believed he was free to leave, the defen-
dant will not be deemed to have been in custody.10 9
"In deciding whether a person was 'in custody,' [courts will] examine
both the presence and extent of physical and psychological restraints placed
upon the person's liberty during the interrogation 'in light of whether a 'rea-
sonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situa-
tion' to be one of custody.""' 0 "Custody occurs not only upon formal arrest,
but also under any circumstances where the suspect is deprived of his free-
dom of movement.""'
Specifically, a person is considered to be in custody when he believes
that "his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal
arrest and .. . [if] that belief is objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances."1 2 A court determines whether a suspect was in custody and enti-
tled to Miranda warnings by asking "first, what were the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances,
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.
' ' 13
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in the "Custody" Determination
Of the six Griffin indicia identified previously, "the first 3 indicia are
mitigating factors which, if present, mitigate against the existence of cus-
tody at the time of questioning. Conversely, the last three indicia are aggra-
108. Jd. at 319-25.
109. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-42.
110. United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 442).
111. United States v. Hanson, 237 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); United States v. McKinney, 88 F.3d 551, 554 (8th Cir.
1996)).
112. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 439; Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125).
113. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
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vating factors which, if present, aggravate the existence of custody." 114 It is
not necessary to a finding of custody that all of the foregoing indicia be
presented by the factual circumstances of a case and a particularly strong
showing with respect to one factor may compensate for a deficiency with
respect to other factors." 5 The following discussion addresses each of the
Griffin indicia in the context of the pretextual use of search warrants in fed-
eral white collar criminal investigations of legitimate businesses to conduct
custodial interrogations of targets, employees, and occupants."16
C. Griffin Factors Mitigating Against the Existence of Custody
1. Whether the Suspect Was Informed at the Time of Questioning,
that the Questioning Was Voluntary, that the Suspect Was Free To
Leave or Could Request the Officers To Do So, or that the Suspect
Was Not Considered Under Arrest
Informing a suspect of his Miranda rights prior to interrogation is a
significant factor mitigating against the existence of custody: The absence
of police advisement that the suspect is not under formal arrest, or that the
suspect is at liberty to decline to answer questions, has been identified as an
important indicium of the existence of a custodial setting." 17
In United States v. Dockery,' 18 for example, no custody was found
where the suspect was advised that she did not have to answer any ques-
tions. Further, she was advised that she was free to go and was not under
arrest, nor was she going to be arrested. Moreover, she voluntarily initiated
a second interview with the federal agents." 9
Statements made by law enforcement officers themselves are perhaps
the most telling signs of whether or not an individual can be deemed to be in
"custody." If the law enforcement officer affirmatively informs the individ-
ual that he is not free to leave, then a reasonable person in the individual's
114. Axsom, 289 F.3d at 500-01.
115. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349 (citations omitted).
116. Bear in mind again, however, that Griffin involved neither the search of a legitimate
business, investigation of a white collar crime, nor an interrogation in connection with the
execution of a search warrant.
117. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349-50 (citations omitted).
118. 736 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1984), cerl denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1980).
119. Id. See also United States v. Lenier, 838 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(stating that freedom to leave the scene is a relevant factor in assessing the totality of the
circumstances); United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding of non-
custodial setting where suspect informed that interview was voluntary); United States v.
Jones, 630 F.2d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[A]bsence of a formal arrest and the advice of
freedom to decline to answer, while not conclusive, are indicative of non-custodial interroga-
tion").
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position, upon being told as much by a law enforcement officer, would ob-
viously not in fact feel free to leave the scene. Conversely, where the law
enforcement officer affirmatively states that no arrest is imminent and that
the individual may terminate the conversation or leave the scene, such facts
would (as envisioned in Griffin) militate against a finding of "custody."
However, what happens when, as in Wallace, the law enforcement of-
ficial is completely silent with respect to whether the individual is free to
leave or whether the individual is not considered to be under arrest? 20 It
seems that when the law enforcement official is silent with respect to these
issues-because the questioning is taking place in the context of the execu-
tion of a search warrant which itself is an extraordinary exercise of govern-
mental power (i.e., to the extent that it requires "probable cause," etc.)--
such circumstances should constitute an aggravating factor (not merely a
mitigating one "when present"). In other words, when officers have not af-
firmatively stated one way or the other whether questioning is voluntary,
whether the individual is free to leave, and whether the individual is not
considered to be under arrest, the harried atmosphere of a search warrant
being executed should be deemed to create a rebuttable inference of cus-
tody.
2. Whether the Suspect Possessed Unrestrained Freedom of Move-
ment During Questioning
As stated previously, Miranda warnings must be given before interro-
gation begins when a suspect is taken into custody or "otherwise signifi-
cantly deprived of his freedom of action."' 12 1 The test is not merely whether
[the suspect] believed he was free to leave; rather that his "freedom of ac-




The mere fact that a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed does not,
however, automatically result in a finding of custody. As one court has
stated:
[t]hough it is often the case that suspects are escorted or chaperoned dur-
ing questioning for reasons unrelated to custody, as in this case where
[the agent] testified that he was concerned for the safety of himself and
120. See United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2003).
121. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
122. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)); United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 (1st Cir. 1986). See also United States v.
Richmond, 860 F.2d 837, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that a defendant drug suspect was
not in custody during the search of his office as "[h]e was never denied permission to leave
the office, nor did he ask to do so. He was denied permission to contact his wife. However,
that does not constitute a significant deprivation of his freedom").
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his partner, "the relevant inquiry is the effect on the suspect." Carter,
884 F.2d at 373, citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422, 104 S. Ct. at 3141.
The "bare fact of physical restraint does not itself invoke Miranda,"
(Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987)), only that restraint
which is of a "degree associated with formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S.
at 1125, 103 S. Ct. at 3520. We realize that the likely effect on a suspect
of being placed under guard during questioning, or told to remain in
sight of interrogating officials, is to associate these with a formal arrest.
Carter, 884 F.2d at 372 (custody where suspect told "just stay here");
Long, 465 F.2d at 68 (custody where suspect continually chaperoned).1
23
Likewise, in United States v. Rorex, 124 questioning conducted at the
suspect's place of employment was held not to be custodial when a federal
agent questioned the suspect in his own office, because the agent "merely
asked a few non-threatening questions ... [and] made no attempt to restrict
[the suspect's] freedom of action."'
125
In the context of a search being executed upon a legitimate business,
courts must carefully examine whether the individual being questioned ac-
tually possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during the questioning.
For instance, in Wallace, the Eighth Circuit noted the district court's finding
that Wallace was restrained because agents corralled the employees at the
onset of the search. 126 The court observed that employees used the rest-
rooms, went outside to smoke, completed ambulance services off the prem-
ises, went to lunch, went shopping, and, after their interviews, returned to
their full work duties. 27 The court then focused upon the individual's re-
straint during the interview and seemed to conclude that, because Wallace
was not physically restrained immediately before or after the interview and
123. United States v. Grifin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1990). United States v.
Longbehn, 850 F.2d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding custody where suspect chaperoned and
told he was not free to leave); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1500 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating custody found where suspect not permitted to move about during search and ques-
tioning); United States v. Venerable, 807 F.2d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1986) (questioning at a
suspect's place of employment not custodial where, during two relatively brief and non-
coercive interviews, he made and received telephone calls and spoke during the interview
with other employees, and left one interview for a period of time).
124. 737 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1984).
125. Under even the most restrictive interpretations of "custody," a person is in custody
when law enforcement officers seize the person to take him to the site of a search warrant for
its execution. See United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that
officers seizing defendant at his workplace, having him stand "spread eagle" against his car,
patting him down for weapons, handcuffing him, and placing him in the backseat of his car
to take him to his residence for execution of search warrant, constituted a seizure). See also
United States v. Tovar-Valdivia, 193 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that
defendant was under arrest when police officer handcuffed him).
126. United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 2003).
127. Id.
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because the interview was short in duration, that she probably was not re-
strained for purposes of a "custody" determination.128 However, that con-
clusion contradicts the court's own rendition of the facts that "[the agent]
initiated Wallace's interview by telling Wallace to come into the employee
lounge" and "after the interview, [the agent] told Wallace she could
leave."' 29 Is such a statement really consistent with a mere "temporary de-
tention" pursuant to execution of a search warrant, as envisioned in Sum-
mers, when it is clear that a federal agent directed Ms. Wallace into a room
for an interrogation and then formally dismissed her once the agent com-
pleted her questioning?
Moreover, the mere fact that individuals are "allowed" to use rest-
rooms, smoke, and eat-all of which relate to physical needs or strong crav-
ings of the human body-is simply not indicative of a person being unre-
strained. Can it really be said that an unelected government officer's act of
allowing a mere bystander at the scene of a search to satisfy a basic, human
urge constitutes prima facie evidence that the bystander's freedom was not
in someway curtailed?
The fact that, as in the Wallace case, other employees were allowed to
complete ambulance runs in response to medical emergencies (and in fur-
therance of that legitimate business's livelihood) also is not a sufficient fac-
tor militating in favor of a finding that individuals were not being restrained.
Law enforcement officials would be strongly and appropriately criticized if
they were to block such important activities absent a true need to restrain
individuals on the premises during a search for items listed in a search war-
rant.
The focus should not merely be on the individual's restraint during the
interview. In Wallace, for example, the government's search of the business
was said to have lasted a number of hours but, because Ms. Wallace's "in-
terview" lasted ten to fifteen minutes, her freedom could not be said to have
been unduly restrained. 30 Clearly, an atmosphere of restraint and govern-
ment intrusion prior to and after the interview could lead a "reasonable per-
son" to believe that he or she felt in the custody of law enforcement offi-
cials.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1110-11 (emphasis added).
130. ld. at 1193.
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3. Whether the Suspect Initiated Contact with the Authorities or Vol-
untarily Acquiesced to Official Requests To Respond to Questions
In California v. Beheler,'3 1 the Supreme Court found there to be no
custodial interrogation when the interview took place at a police station
where the suspect had voluntarily gone to talk with officers. Likewise, in
Thatsaphone v. Weber,'32 the suspect came to an interview voluntarily, was
told he was not under arrest, and left without hindrance after a short inter-
view. The detective in Thatsaphone advised that the interview was volun-
tary and that the suspect was free to leave.
133
Therefore, if the interview process was voluntary and the individual
was not directed to participate in the interview by law enforcement officers,
courts often rule that suppression of statements made in the interview is not
appropriate.134 In Rorex, the defendant was neither placed in custody, nor
was subject to the type of environment giving rise to the Miranda warnings.
Likewise, in Richmann, the defendant repeated his statements after being
given Miranda warnings.
As noted in Miranda, "custodial interrogation [means] questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers."' 135 Applying this factor, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has frequently found custody lacking where the suspect made the initial
contact with law enforcement officers. 1
36
[W]hen the confrontation between the suspect and the criminal justice
system is instigated at the direction of law enforcement officers, rather
than the suspect, custody is more likely to exist. Longbehn, 850 F.2d at
451 (custodial interrogation initiated when police confronted suspect at
the firing range); Carter, 884 F.2d at 369 (custodial interrogation initi-
ated when police confronted suspect at work); see also Minnick, 498
U.S. at 152, 111 S. Ct. at 490 (prior invocation of Fifth Amendment
privilege mitigated where "the accused himself initiate further commu-
nication, exchanges, or conversations with the police").1
37
131. 463 U.S. 1121, 1122-23 (1983).
132. 137 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1998).
133. Id.
134. United States v. Richmann, 860 F.2d 837, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1984).
135. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
136. United States v. Dockery, 736 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding no custody
where suspect initiated the interview); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir.
1985) (finding no custody where the suspect voluntarily came to the station house for ques-
tioning two days after officers left a message at his home requesting a visit); Leviston v.
Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming no custody where suspect initiated in-
quiry by voluntarily speaking with investigators).
137. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1351.
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When government officials are executing a search warrant upon the
premises of a legitimate business, the very fact of the law enforcement offi-
cers' presence is the best evidence of their desire for information or things.
In other words, their very (unexpected) appearance at the scene to execute
the warrant, by definition, reflects that such presence was initiated by the
law enforcement officers and not by the business being searched. Taking it
one step further, it is patently obvious that any questioning which then oc-
curs by officials at the scene, of individuals on the scene, will almost surely
have been initiated by the law enforcement officers due to their stated pur-
pose of executing the warrant. 3 8 It simply defies logic to suggest that, on
the very day that the search and questioning occurs, the employer operating
the business would have summoned the law enforcement officials to the
business to engage them in communications, exchanges, or conversations.
Finally, in Wallace, the law enforcement officer's preprinted list of
written questions made it clear that the law enforcement officers-not the
interrogated individual-were the parties intent on engaging in conversation
and questioning. If Miranda can be summarized as setting forth principles
governing custodial interrogation questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers, nowhere is this better evidenced than in a law enforcement offi-
cer's pre-search preparation of questions to ask individuals present at the
scene of the execution of a search warrant.
Such questioning clearly does not constitute mere "general on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general question-
ing of citizens in the fact finding process" which might constitute "an active
responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they
have to aid in law enforcement.' 39 To the contrary, evidence that the law
enforcement agent possessed and utilized a customized, prepared question-
naire clearly reflects the pretextual nature of the search and evidences the
official's clear intent to exceed the authority to temporarily detain granted
the official by Summers and its progeny.' 40 To ignore the significance of the
previously-prepared questions ignores the reality of the situation, that is,
that a pre-planned custodial interrogation took place under the guise of a
mere search warrant execution, all in violation of Ms. Wallace's constitu-
tional rights because her Miranda rights were never given.
138. United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581(9th Cir. 1987) (finding custodial
interrogation initiated when police drove to remote part of suspect's ranch where suspect was
herding cattle to conduct questioning); United States v. Maher, 801 F.2d 1477, 1499 (6th
Cir. 1986) (affirming custodial interrogation initiated when police executed search warrant
on suspect's place of business).
139. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
140. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 ("[A] warrant to search ... founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted").
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D. Griffin Factors Which Aggravate the Existence of Custody
1. Whether Strong Arm Tactics or Deceptive Stratagems Were Em-
ployed During the Questioning
This indicia is clear-the use of strong arm or deceptive strategies
weighs in favor of a finding of custody. For example, in United States v.
Hanson,l4 ' the defendant initiated the interview with law enforcement offi-
cers, was told that he was not under arrest even though he was a suspect,
and was permitted to leave the police station after the interrogation without
being arrested.142 While the district court found no custody, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court's finding. The court found that the agents had
engaged in a deliberate subterfuge in obtaining his acquiescence to the in-
terview because they did not inform him about the true nature of their inter-
est in him as a suspect; the environment in which the interview was con-
ducted was police dominated and intimidating; and the interview lasted for
over two hours without Hanson being advised of his right to counsel. 143 The
Court found that the circumstances under which the statements were made
were so inherently coercive that Hanson must have known he was not free
to leave the station once officers disclosed their real purpose for wanting to
interview him. 144
Likewise, the use of a search warrant to coerce interrogations of occu-
pants of legitimate businesses at the scene of that search warrant's execution
is a law enforcement tactic which would come within this factor. Griffin
notes that:
police deployment of strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems during
interrogation ... is a practice widely condemned in American law. ...
An interrogation can still be custodial even though no strong arm tactics
are used, .... but the absence of such tactics is a factor which can assist
us in reaching an objective conclusion that the suspect could not have
associated the questioning with formal arrest.
145
While in Wallace146 the Eighth Circuit took note of the district court's
conclusion that the law enforcement officials did not use strong arm tactics
nor deceptive stratagems, the use of search warrant executions and subse-
141. 237 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2001).
142. Id. at 964.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 965.
145. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1351 (8th Cir. 1990).
146. United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2003).
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quent abuse of the limited detention allowed officials by Summers and its
progeny obviously constitutes a strong arm tactic or deceptive stratagem. 1
47
Such interrogations are "strong arm" in the sense that the questioning
was not initiated after, for example, a mere request left on a telephone an-
swering machine to come by a police station. Rather, it was part and parcel
of a surprise search by a number of storming, usually-armed, federal agents
without any notice to those present at the scene. Such a sudden intrusion is
as "strong arm" as officials can get in this day and age, as evidenced by the
fact that the officials are generally required to first obtain a warrant only
upon a showing of probable cause.
The tactic is "deceptive" in the sense that the officials who procure the
warrant have failed to inform the neutral and detached magistrate that they
also intend to question individuals at the scene (e.g., with a preprinted list of
questions), 48 in addition to searching for items identified in the warrant
which allegedly can be found at the premises. In other words, the magistrate
is not informed as to the full nature of the intrusion and the true intentions
of those doing the intruding. The very officials who purport to be enforcing
the law are themselves, when securing search warrants to investigate sup-
posed "criminal activity," making representations to federal courts under
false pretenses.
2. Whether the Atmosphere of Questioning Was Police Dominated
A factor indicating custody is when, during questioning, the suspect is
isolated from others who might lend support. 149 Related to this issue is
whether the questioning was conducted in an environment in which the sub-
ject was less comfortable. For example, questioning in a police station
would lean toward a police dominated interview.
The "good cop," "bad cop" approach is also indicative of a police-
dominated atmosphere. 50 However, questioning a suspect at his residence
147. The author submits that a presumption of impropriety should attach to any circum-
stance in which the officers use coercive interrogation techniques to obtain confessions. See,
e.g., United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1989) (no good faith exception to
"inadvertent" use of coercive interrogation tactics because inquiry concerns the effect of the
interrogation techniques on the suspect).
148. As in Wallace, 323 F.3d at 1111.
149. Carter, 884 F.2d at 372; see also United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581
(9th Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 127, 127-28 (9th Cir. 1987); cf United States v. Jorgensen, 871
F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1989).
150. Carter, 884 F.2d at 372 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452, 455 (1966))
("Mutt and Jeff' technique atmosphere indicative of coercive, police dominated atmosphere).
"In th[ese] technique[s], two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who
knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a dozen men away
for this crime and he's going to send the subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the other
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would arguably be more comfortable.' 5' "The place where an interrogation
takes place does not conclusively establish the presence, or absence, of cus-
tody. "A deprivation of freedom may take place at one's home as well as at
the police station. By the same token, an interrogation at the police station
may be non-custodial."' 52 In Axsom, for example, the defendant was advised
that he was not under arrest but that the officers would like to speak to him
if he would agree. 153 Axsom was permitted to dress before the interview
since he answered the door wearing a towel. The interview was conducted
in his living room where he sat in a chair smoking his pipe. He was pro-
vided a glass of water when he was thirsty. He was permitted to move about
his residence and answer the telephone, although he was escorted to the
restroom. 1
54
Numerous cases have held that questioning at a suspect's place of em-
ployment is non-custodial in nature. 55 However, there can be no doubt that
questioning during the execution of a search warrant is police dominated in
nature. "Where the conduct of the police leads a suspect to believe that the
police have taken full control of the scene, then [courts] are more likely to
recognize the existence of custody."' 5 6 Questioning at an individual's place
of employment can, therefore, under some circumstances, be custodial in
nature.
In Carter, a mail room clerk was questioned in the bank president's of-
fice by postal inspectors. 57 Such questioning constituted a custodial inter-
hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was
involved in a little scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to
get him off the case if the subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for very long. The
subject would be wise to make a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both
investigators present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at
some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the
room." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Hanson, 237
F.2d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that the environment in which the interview was con-
ducted was police-dominated and intimidating).
151. United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2002).
152. United States v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). but see
United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 582 (9th Cir. 1987) (questioning of suspect
near where he was herding cattle held custodial); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477,
1500 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that subject questioned at place of employment held to be in
custody).
153. Axsom, 289 F.3d at 497-98.
154. Id.
155. See United States v. Venerable, 807 F.2d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dockery, 736 F.2d 1232, 1234
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984).
156. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990); but see Axsom, 289
F.3d at 503 (finding that while execution of the search warrant was certainly police domi-
nated, the interview between the two agents and Axsom was not).
157. United States v. Carter, 844 F.2d 368, 369 (8th Cir. 1989).
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rogation because, under the facts of that case, the questioning did not take
place at the employee's usual work station and because the officers told him
not to leave. 158 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that this police domi-
nated atmosphere militated in favor of a custodial interrogation.1
59
Questioning pursuant to a search warrant being executed on a legiti-
mate business premises will typically constitute a police-dominated atmos-
phere which militates in favor of a finding of custody for purposes of
Miranda. Specifically, Griffin recognizes that the issue with respect to this
fifth indicium of custody
is whether the entire context of questioning, including such considera-
tions as place and length of the interrogation, demonstrates that the
course of the investigation was police dominated .... Other circum-
stances which indicate police domination of the custodial surroundings
concern whether the police assumed control of the interrogation site and
'dictate the course of conduct followed by the [suspect]' or other per-
sons present at the scene.160
Summers and its progeny teach that when law enforcement officials are
executing a search warrant they are entitled to temporarily detain individu-
als during the execution of such warrant, thereby dictating the course of
their conduct at the scene. There is also no doubt that, during the execution
of such search warrants, law enforcement officials control the scene. It is
patently obvious that the execution of a search warrant takes place in the
context of a clearly police dominated atmosphere which should result in a
presumption that a reasonable person would objectively feel as if they were
in custody during any questioning which takes place during the search.
3. Whether the Suspect Was Placed Under Arrest at the Termination
of the Questioning
The Eighth Circuit has opined that lack of an arrest constitutes a "very
important" factor weighing against custody. 16' The issue is whether a rea-
sonable person would believe he is under formal arrest. A reasonable per-
son, for purposes of this determination, is also construed to be an innocent
person. 1
62
At least in the context of search warrants being executed upon inher-
ently legal businesses, the fact that an arrest does not take place subsequent
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1352 (quoting United States v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613, 616 (8th
Cir. 1986)).
161. United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1991).
162. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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to the interrogation is not nearly as important a criterion in such cases. To
the extent that the investigation is a federal inquiry into alleged white collar
criminal law violations, formal arrests are not nearly as common as they are
in investigations involving so-called "street crime" such as murder, bur-
glary, rape, robbery, and drug dealing.
Owners of legitimate businesses are often prominent, well-respected
members of their communities, typically have families, friends, and col-
leagues in the area, and are therefore deemed to be unlikely candidates for
escape. Many accused of white collar crimes are politically powerful and
affluent, and many have businesses to operate and attend to pending any
investigation or prosecution. These business owners are often accused of
mere regulatory violations or of committing questionable acts with respect
to "gray areas" in the law. These individuals, cloaked with these characteris-
tics and charged with these types of crimes, are simply not as likely to be
formally arrested following an interrogation as those accused of "street
crimes." In such cases, law enforcement officials usually know where they
can find the white collar criminal defendant if it indeed becomes necessary
to arrest. More often than not, white collar suspects typically turn them-
selves in for booking when requested and no physical restraints, such as
handcuffs, are typically used (at least perhaps until the individual is con-
victed, has exhausted his appeals, and is sent to a federal penitentiary).
Consequently, formal arrest does not play a prominent role in these
cases such that the lack of an arrest subsequent to an interrogation cannot
legitimately be considered as a factor militating against a finding of cus-
tody. In other words, law enforcement officers do not lack the intent to cre-
ate a custodial atmosphere while executing a search merely because a for-
mal arrest does not take place after an interrogation. It instead merely re-
flects the fact that white collar crime is investigated and prosecuted in a
manner much different than other types of criminal cases.
V. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL INDICIA FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SEARCH WARRANTS
BEING PRETEXTUALLY UTILIZED TO QUESTION TARGETS, EMPLOYEES,
AND OCCUPANTS OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES
A. The Argument for Additional Indicia
It is clear that the list of Griffin factors is not exhaustive:
[rjealizing that the available means of coercion are as vast as the circum-
stances in which it may arise, we emphasize that the foregoing list is
merely intended to be representative of those indicia of custody most
[Vol. 26
PRETEXTUAL USE OF SEARCH WARRANTS
frequently cited by this and other courts when undergoing the prescribed
totality of the circumstances analysis. Lanier, 838 F.2d at 285; Helmel,
769 F.2d at 1320.163
Again, "[t]he custody issue ultimately 'focuses upon the totality of the cir-
cumstances.""64
B. Suggested Additional Indicia in Instances Involving Federal White
Collar Criminal Investigations of Legitimate Businesses
Additional indicia should be considered by reviewing courts in deter-
mining whether custodial interrogations took place in the course of search
warrants being executed on legitimate businesses. Griffin clearly affords the
consideration of additional factors. Specifically, courts should review the
totality of all the circumstances relevant to the questioning in dispute, inclu-
sive of the factors identified below as well as the "regular" Griffin factors.
Federal agents should simply not be allowed to enter legitimate businesses
under the guise of a valid search warrant to conduct pretextual interroga-
tions, which would otherwise not be proper. Additional criteria will assist
courts in identifying situations and Miranda violations incident thereto.
1. Whether the Business Being Searched is an Inherently Legal
Business as Opposed to an Inherently Illegal Business
a. Inapplicability of Michigan v. Summers
As stated previously, when executing search warrants, the initial
rounding up and temporary detention by federal agents of employees and
occupants at the scene has been justified by the United States Supreme
Court. 165 This is purportedly because the intrusiveness of detaining occu-
pants of the premises is outweighed by the law enforcement interests in (1)
preventing flight, (2) minimizing risk to officers, and (3) "conducting an
orderly search.' 66 The justifications contained in Summers are simply not
163. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349.
164. United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Jenner v.
Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 335 (8th Cir. 1993)). Additional factors should be considered because
"all official questioning has some coercive aspects." Sutera, 933 F.2d at 647, (citing United
States v. Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1984)). The authors note that in the post-Enron
era of the federal government's purported "crackdown" on corporate crime, federal agents
seem to more frequently parade prominent white collar criminal defendants in handcuffs in
front of the television cameras. It is the authors' experience, however, that this is still the
exception rather than the rule.
165. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
166. See United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 778 (8th Cir. 2001).
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applicable in the searches of legitimate business in which no arrests are
planned. Significantly, the Summers Court expressly reserved the question
of whether detention would be justified if the search warrant authorized the
seizure of evidence in general, rather than mere contraband. 167 Summers had
nothing to do with the search of a legitimate business. To the contrary, it
involved the search of a residence for narcotics, i.e., heroin, and not for
business records. 168 The issue was whether Summers' pre-arrest seizure on
the front porch of his house was constitutional. 1
69
Quoting Dunaway v. New York,170 the United States Supreme Court
expressed its reservations concerning seizure exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment: "[i]ndeed, any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as intru-
sive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that
Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable
cause."' 171 In Dunaway, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that an official
seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no for-
mal arrest is made. The Court specifically held that the detention of a mur-
der suspect located at a neighbor's house, who was taken into custody and
transported to the police station where he eventually confessed, was "indis-
tinguishable from a traditional arrest."'
' 72
The Summers Court held that the type of detention imposed in that
case, i.e., the detention of one of the residents while their premises was be-
ing searched, was less intrusive than the search itself.' 73 In so ruling, the
Court "assumed" that, unless they intended flight to avoid an arrest, most
citizens "would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their pos-
sessions."'174 The Court specifically ruled out any pretextual or exploitive
reasons for the detention:
[f]urthermore, the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be ex-
ploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more informa-
tion, because the information the officers seek [i.e., contraband in the
form of heroin] normally will be obtained through the search and not
through the detention.175
167. See id. at 705 n.20; United States v. Rowe, 694 F. Supp. 1420, 1423 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
168. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.
169. Id. at 696.
170. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
171. Summers, 452 U.S. at 697 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213).
172. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
173. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
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The Court distinguished the seizure in Dunaway "which was designed
to provide an opportunity for interrogation .... , The Court also con-
cluded that the seizure in that case was "not likely to have coercive aspects
likely to induce self-incrimination. 177
Again, the distinguishing factors identified by the Court in Summers
are the very reasons why the holding in Summers cannot justify the pretex-
tual use of search warrants to conduct interrogations of occupants of legiti-
mate businesses. The holding was rooted in "the justification for the deten-
tion of an occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a
valid warrant" and nothing more.1 78 Indeed, courts should not "assume that
Summers' general rule automatically applies" but rather should "apply the
analytical approach used in Summers" to balance "law enforcement interests
and the individualized suspicion against the intrusiveness of the seizure."'1
79
b. Preventing flight
The first justification of preventing flight simply does not apply to the
search of legitimate businesses for business records. In a search of an inher-
ently illegal business, such as a drug house, house of prostitution, or gam-
bling house, it would not at all be unusual for individuals to spill out of the
facility and scatter in every direction upon the commencement of an exe-
cuted search. There is no question that, when people are engaged in or oth-
erwise associated with these blatantly illegal types of activities, they know
they are likely engaging in criminal behavior for which, if caught, they will
be punished. They have every incentive to escape the scene of the search,
both to evade arrest as well as to conceal or destroy contraband.
It is one thing, as in Summers, to detain an individual at his residence
to determine if a valid search uncovers contraband. It is a far different mat-
ter to detain employees of a legitimate business in the execution of a search
warrant for business records.180 In evaluating the justification rooted in pre-
vention of flight, "the distinction between searches for contraband and




178. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
179. Levito v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 170 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Heitschmidt v. City
of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that Summers rejected "a
completely ad hoc approach" but applying Summers' balancing approach where the detention
at issue was more severe than that in Summers).
180. "The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily iden-
tifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a deten-
tion of that occupant." Summers, 452 U.S. at 703--04. This rationale simply does not apply to
occupants of legitimate businesses.
181. Levito, 258 F.3d at 170.
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It is not uncommon for a search for contraband to produce items that
justify an immediate arrest of the owner or resident of the premises, and
a person who anticipates that a search may imminently result in his or
her arrest has a strong incentive to flee. By contrast, a search for evi-
dence - particularly complicated documentary evidence - is much less
likely to uncover items that lead to an immediate arrest. Thus, even if
the search is successful, the suspect may well remain at liberty for some
time until the evidence is examined and an indictment is obtained. As a
result, the incentive to flee is greatly diminished.
182
In an inherently legal business, most employees may be wholly un-
aware that their employer is allegedly engaged in criminal wrongdoing or
that federal law enforcement authorities may consider that the very jobs in
which they engage and with which they support their families may further
an activity that the federal government deems illegal. "[A] search for evi-
dence [as opposed to contraband] will rarely give rise to an individualized
suspicion that the occupant is committing a crime on the premises.'
183
As opposed to finding people in illegitimate businesses sitting at tables
weighing cocaine or secretively operating roulette wheels, the searchers of a
legitimate business are likely to find people making copies, sitting at desks,
or working on computers. The individuals are typically stunned, wide-eyed,
and willing to follow directions. If anything, some employees and occupiers
of the premises at a legitimate business would naively be willing to stay at
the scene of the search (instead of leaving for the day) as part of a voluntary
effort to provide assistance to the federal agents so as to "clear up any mis-
understandings" about the "obvious mistake" inherent in the decision to
search "their office" or "their employer's business." Surely one would not
argue that persons who are presumed innocent until proven guilty have lost
their constitutional protections by remaining at their place of business to
observe the search being conducted.
Searches of illegitimate and legitimate businesses are simply very dif-
ferent. Accordingly, the first justification for temporarily detaining indi-
viduals when executing a search warrant preventing flight is not as a great a
concern in the context of legitimate businesses as it might be in the context
of illegitimate businesses.
182. Id.; see also United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
that tax evasion is a crime that is "generally only detected through the careful analysis and
synthesis of a large number of documents").
183. United States v. Rowe, 694 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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c. Minimizing Risk of Harm to Officers
Minimizing risk of harm to officers is the second criteria.' 84 These
concerns do not typically arise in white collar criminal investigations and
searches of legitimate businesses.' 85 Rarely are the officers in uniform and
even rarer are weapons displayed or brandished during a search. To the con-
trary, often the federal agents are dressed in business suits with any weap-
ons that they are carrying concealed within the agent's clothes. Because it is
a legitimate business, it is highly unlikely that anyone else except the agents
themselves are carrying weapons. This is a far cry from searches of illegiti-
mate operations, such as drug houses, houses of prostitution, gambling
houses, organized crime entities, or those harboring other illicit activities. In
those instances federal agents have legitimate concerns about their safety
and the second justification would probably have a basis in fact.
For example, in the fact scenario presented in Wallace,' 86 federal
agents executed a search upon a long-established ambulance transportation
service which was engaged in the legitimate business of saving lives and
providing medical attention to those in need. While the Eighth Circuit's
opinion reflects that a temporary detention of the ambulance service's em-
ployees was proper pursuant to Summers, the court's reasoning merely as-
sumed the presence of the second justification underlying Summers without
articulating any detailed basis for why the federal agents who performed the
search feared any harm would result from that search.1
87
The rationale stated in Summers for this second criterion does not ap-
ply to interrogations conducted during the search of legitimate businesses,
i.e., "the execution of a search warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to con-
184. This criteria is somewhat similar to the so-called "public safety" exception which
stands for the proposition that Miranda rights are not required to be given in instances in
which "a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
[Miranda] rule" protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (finding that Miranda warnings are unnecessary
prior to questioning when "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety"); see
also United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953 (8th Cir. 1999). Whether reasonable con-
cern for public safety exists in a given situation does not depend upon the officer's irrelevant,
subjective views but instead depends upon objective facts and whether a reasonable officer
would conclude that there was a significant threat to public safety. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
185. See Levito, 258 F.3d at 171 (the facts did not suggest that the defendant under inves-
tigation for tax crimes had any ties to violent organizations or a record for violence. There-
fore, there was no compelling safety reason for detaining the defendant during the lengthy
search).
186. United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2003).
187. Wallace, 323 F.3d at I I11. The authors further submit that if occupants are allowed
to leave the premises instead of being detained, any claim of risk of harm would be lessened
even further thereby minimizing the perceived risk of harm to the officers.
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ceal or destroy evidence."' 88 However, just because police have probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant, this fact does not give authorization
to search all occupants of a premise without probable cause. 89 A legitimate
fear of harm-while perhaps appropriate with respect to inherently illegal
businesses and operations-simply does not exist as a practical matter when
federal agents execute a warrant to search a small town ambulance company
and even a large company like Enron. Assuming that (1) federal agents exe-
cuted a search warrant on the once-prominent accounting firm, Arthur
Anderson, and (2) federal agents temporarily detained individuals (and per-
haps questioned them) when performing those searches pursuant to Sum-
mers, federal agents most likely did not actually fear for their safety. Ac-
cordingly, in the context of federal white collar criminal investigations of
legitimate businesses, the second justification, fear of risk of harm, as a
practical matter, does not exist and thus does not outweigh the intrusion on
individuals' liberties.' 90
d. Conducting an orderly search
Finally, the third justification underlying the limited detention author-
ized by Summers is identified as conducting an orderly search.' 9' If so, it
seems inconsistent with the stated purpose to utilize the available manpower
of officers to interrogate occupants of the premises as opposed to the same
188. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).
189. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that although search warrant,
issued upon probable cause, gave police officers authority to search premises of small public
tavern and to search the bartender for narcotics, pat-down search and seizure of patron was
not constitutionally permissible where there was no reasonable belief that patron was in-
volved in any criminal activity or that patron was armed and dangerous).
190. See id. at 92-93 ("[A] reasonable belief that [a person] was armed and presently
dangerous ... must form the predicate to a pat down of a person for weapons."); see also
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1092 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A police officer may
search a detained individual for weapons if he has reasonable suspicion that the individual
could be armed and dangerous to the officer or others."); United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1989) (search and seizure upheld where officer "was armed with sufficient
facts to be concerned about his safety and that of his fellow officers"); United States v. Co-
rona, 661 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that officer must "have a founded suspicion,
based upon articulable facts, that [the suspect] was armed and presently dangerous"); United
States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 159, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[P]rotective searches are author-
ized only when the police officer has suspicion that the individual before him may be armed
or otherwise presently dangerous."); United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1980)
(requiring "that specific articulable facts support an inference that the suspect might be
armed and dangerous"); Meredith v. Erath, 182 F. Supp. 2d 964, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (in the
context of a civil rights case, finding "no evidence the agents were attempting to prevent the
flight of the occupants by detaining them" and "no evidence that any of these individuals
presented any risk of harm to the agents").
191. 452 U.S. at 705.
[Vol. 26
PRETEXTUAL USE OF SEARCH WARRANTS
officers helping to conduct the search. 192 Indeed, the use of officers to con-
duct interrogations when such officers would otherwise participate in the
search demonstrates the pretextual nature of this justification. Furthermore,
one must ask what would result in a more orderly search (since the warrant
is presumed to facially authorize only a search of the premises and not a
search of any persons): detaining all of the employees and occupants in a
single room and then letting them travel from room to room throughout the
premises, or not detaining them at all and letting them leave the premises?
Under the second option both the governmental interest in conducting an
orderly search (without undue interference) and the individuals' interest in
freedom from restraint (and wrongful interrogation) are served. Courts
should analyze the extent to which detention will add to the intrusiveness of
the search itself, whether law enforcement officers are likely to exploit or
unduly prolong the detention to gain information, and the extent to which
the detention adds to the public stigma associated with the search."' 93 For
example, in Leveto, the court held that since the warrants in the case were
executed by a large group of agents, once the searches of the home and hos-
pital were underway the need to detain the defendant to prevent loss of evi-
dence was minimal. 1
94
e. Summary
The Summers decision is based upon the search for contraband at an
individual's residence' 95 and should not apply to the search for evidence at
legitimate businesses. Indeed, the Court specifically did not decide the issue
of "whether the same result would be justified if the search warrant merely
authorized a search for evidence."'
196
If agents are truly concerned about the Summers justifications (pre-
venting flight, minimizing risk of harm to officers, and conducting an or-
derly search), would not these interests be best served by executing search
warrants of legitimate businesses during non-business hours? If the search is
192. See Wallace, 323 F.3d at 1111.
193. Meredith, 182 F. Supp. at 980 (citing United States v. Rowe, 694 F. Supp. 1420,
1423-24 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
194. See also Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1998) (once
premises is secure no justification for prolonging physically intrusive detention); United
States v. Timpani, 665 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1981) (agents reasonably barred the detainee
from leaving or calling anyone during the first forty-five minutes of a five-hour search "until
other coordinated searches were under way" to prevent premature warning).
195. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 ("Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is con-
ducted.")
196. ld. at n.20.
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truly for business records (which is what is typically authorized by a search
warrant of a legitimate business), why would agents execute search warrants
during peak business hours when the maximum number of employees are
present? It is patently obvious that federal law enforcement authorities are
pretextually using executions of search warrants to conduct custodial inter-
rogations of targets, employees, and occupants of legitimate businesses.
However, the authors submit that the Summers Court did not intend such
exploitive and pretextual interrogations.
Once the justifications underlying the authority for limited detentions
expressed in Summers are cast aside, the authors submit that it is difficult to
justify the initial rounding up and temporary detention of occupants of a
legitimate business as anything other than a custodial situation, thus prompt-
ing any interrogation taking place thereafter to be preceded by the issuance
of Miranda warnings. For these reasons, the nature of the business itself
should be an additional criterion in determining whether or not certain inter-
rogations are custodial in nature.
f. The argument for a prophylactic rule
The authors of this article suggest that the Griffin analysis and Sum-
mers analysis simply miss the point with regard to custodial interrogations.
These cases focus upon whether detentions in connection with the execution
of a search warrant were constitutionally permissible. Regardless of whether
constitutional justifications for detentions exist, the fact remains that such
detentions are custodial in nature and any interrogations trigger the Miranda
warnings. Accordingly, the authors submit that a prophylactic rule should
be applied to such custodial interrogations and the courts should require that
Miranda warnings be given in all such interrogations.
In United States v. Rowe,' 97 the court provided the following response
to the government's argument that Summers allows agents to detain the oc-
cupants of premises while executing a search warrant:
This argument misses the point. Although as is discussed in the previous
section, the defendant's detention was justified under Summers, the sub-
sequent interrogation of the defendant was not. The Summers opinion
"nowhere suggests that the mere fact that a 'detention' permissible for
Fourth Amendment purposes [makes] it any less 'custodial' for Miranda
purposes." United States v. Morales, 611 F. Supp. 242, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); See United States v. Stevens, 543 F. Supp. 929, 942-44 (N.D. I11.
1982)."'
197. Rowe, 694 F. Supp. at 1420.
198. Id. at 1425.
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In Rowe the defendant was charged with assisting an escape, conceal-
ing a person from arrest, and making false statements during an investiga-
tion. The court held, with regard to statements made by the defendant in
response to interrogation by the police during the execution of a search war-
rant, that the issue was "whether the defendant was effectively in custody
when she made the challenged statements."' 99 After reviewing the facts of
the detention the court concluded that under the circumstances the defen-
dant might reasonably have concluded that she was not free to leave and
that she was in custody. 200 "Furthermore, one purpose of the interview ap-
pears to have been to elicit damaging responses from the defendant, who at
that time was very much the target of an investigation.,
20'
Likewise, in United States v. Stevens,20 2 the defendant was charged
with receiving two stolen motion pictures and infringing copyrights of those
two films. There, the defendant was interrogated during the course of execu-
tion of a search warrant. In granting the defendant's motion to suppress the
court stated that "[t]he detention in this case probably had two designs. The
first design, permissible under Summers, was to allow the proper execution
of the search warrant. The second design was apparently to provide an op-
portunity for interrogation. 20 3 It was clear under the facts of the case that
the defendants were not free to leave until after they were interviewed by
the agent. 20 4 "Asking them questions during this detention, without provid-
ing Miranda warnings, was improper. This was a detention for the purpose
of providing an opportunity for the interrogation which led to confessions..
. and the statements made to [the agent] must be suppressed., 20 5 The court
held that it was permissible for the agents to ask the defendants questions to
identify themselves, but it was not permissible for the purpose of asking
questions designed to illicit incriminating statements.20 6
Finally, in United States v. Morales,2 °7 the court held that the responses
of a defendant to questions by police officers requesting the identity of the
owner of heroin during the search of an apartment were the result of "custo-
dial interrogation" and thus had to be suppressed.
While the holding in Summers justified defendant's detention as an oc-
cupant of the premises for which a valid search warrant was being exe-




202. 543 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. 111. 1982).
203. Id. at 943.
204. Id. at 944.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 944-45.
207. 611 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 788 F.2d 883 (1986)
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tion" may have been permissible for Fourth Amendment purposes made
it any less "custodial" for Miranda purposes.
20
8
Therefore, the court held that when police asked, "[w]hose are these?," the
officer should have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response. 20 9 As such, it was a custodial interrogation with-
out the benefit of the defendant's Miranda rights and was therefore sup-
pressed.21°
The detention of occupants of premises during the execution of search
warrants constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. A seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs "whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away."2 1 '
Even if constitutionally permissible, detentions and interrogations of
targets, employees, and occupants of legitimate businesses during execution
of search warrants trigger the Miranda warnings. An interrogation occurs if
the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. If the
detainee has not been advised of his Miranda rights, any statements given
and the fruits thereof should be suppressed.
2. The Individual's Sophistication and Prior Dealings or Contact
with Law Enforcement Officers
This article focuses upon legitimate businesses which are not inher-
ently illegal entities such as drug houses or prostitution houses. In the for-
mer types of establishments, the occupants of the businesses typically will
not have had prior substantive dealings or contact with law enforcement
officers and will not expect sudden police intrusions. As a practical matter,
these factors place them in a much more vulnerable situation and make
them much less likely to exercise their constitutional rights under the Fifth
Amendment.21 2 Furthermore, the lower on the management chain, the less
208. Id. at 245.
209. See id. at 245-46.
210. Id. at246.
211. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (finding that detention of home-
owner was a seizure where he "was not free to leave the premises while the officers were
searching his home"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19 n.16 (1967) ("[W]hen [an] officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen ... we [may] conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."; United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d
157, 159 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that restriction of freedom to leave "by physical restraint or
by sufficient show of authority" effects a seizure).
212. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1965). The Miranda Court recognized this
fact by quoting P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958) which stated
that "[i]t is probable that even today, when there is much less ignorance about these matters
than formerly, there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions put to you by a
policeman, or at least that it will be worse for you if you do not." Id. at 468. These words, the
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sophistication an employee likely has in dealing with either law enforce-
ment officials or legal matters in general.
The fact that a suspect has never previously been detained or ques-
tioned by law enforcement officials is a relevant consideration. 213 This is
especially true when the officials use a "Mutt and Jeff' technique indicated,
of course, in a police dominated atmosphere.2t 4 The Eighth Circuit has rec-
ognized that one factor to consider is the "age and experience of the person
interviewed., 21 5 Likewise, "a suspect's language skills may be relevant to
the 'in custody' issue.,
2 16
These are important considerations because without contemplating
such important factors as the defendant's experience, age, education, lin-
guistic abilities, prior dealings with law enforcement, and overall level of
sophistication, a court cannot meaningfully consider whether or not a rea-
sonable person in that suspect's position would have believed that he was or
was not in custody at that moment. These factors are largely measurable and
objective rather than subjective in nature, such that the factors are fully con-
sistent with the objective "reasonable suspect" test.
A person's susceptibility to being compelled to speak and answer ques-
tions-thereby increasing the likelihood of incriminating himself-is obvi-
ously greater when one has had little or no experience with law enforcement
officials, when one is very young or very old, when one possesses little
formal education, when one's ability to speak English is relatively limited,
etc. "[T]he modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented., 21 7 Unsophisticated individuals, as well as
those having previously limited dealings with law enforcement officers, will
naturally be more susceptible to psychological techniques.
In applying an objective test when considering "custody," which con-
templates the mindset of a "reasonable person" in the position of a suspect
hampered with one or more of these attributes, such attributes should actu-
ally be taken into consideration when determining whether that suspect was
or was not "in custody" at a given moment. For example, those persons in-
volved in inherently illegal criminal enterprises will naturally be less sur-
prised and better equipped to deal with sudden police incursions and inter-
rogations than employees of legitimate businesses. The custodial determina-
authors submit, still ring true today.
213. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v.
Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1989).
214. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452-55.
215. United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Rorex, 737 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1984)).
216. Thatsaphone v. Weber, 137 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1998); see also United States
v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 42, 48 n.4 (2d Cir. 1987).
217. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
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tions for targets, employees, or occupants of a legitimate business differ
than those for the individuals involved in inherently illegal activities.
3. Whether the Individual Is or May Be a Target of the Investigation
Stated another way, were the government agent's actions inquisitive or
inquisitorial? If inquisitorial, as to the person being interrogated, this factor
would weigh in favor of creating a custodial atmosphere justifying the giv-
ing of Miranda warnings." 8 The Supreme Court has recognized that these
subjective beliefs may be an appropriate factor in determining custody:
In sum, an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or
beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being ques-
tioned, may be one of many factors that bear upon the assessment
whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officers' views or
beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation
and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would
perceive his or her freedom to leave.
219
In order to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officials must
demonstrate "probable cause" and have some justification to believe that
illegal activity was or is ongoing. The question then arises as to whether the
person being interrogated is or may be a suspect in connection with this
activity. If so, this places the individual directly in a zone of jeopardy for
which the Fifth Amendment protections were specifically intended. More-
over, human nature being what it is, these subjective beliefs will more often
than not be manifested in objective conduct.
Courts often ignore this reality and discount whether the individual is
or may be a target for purposes of custody determinations. Courts have
opined that "[t]he fact that an investigation may be said to have been fo-
cused on a particular person does not necessarily make questioning custo-
dial.
220
"The rationale for this statement is that the investigation's focus pro-
ceeds from the officer's subjective intentions, and thus has little bearing on
the suspect's reasonable belief about his situation except to the extent that
218. See Rorex, 737 F.2d at 756.
219. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994).
220. Beckwith v. United States, 425 US. 341 (1976) (questioning by IRS agent during
tax investigation held non-custodial); see also Rorex, 737 F.2d at 755 (quoting United States
v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139, 145 (7th Cir. 1979)); United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 991
(8th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[t]he fact that the investigation ... may be said to have focused
on the defendant is insufficient to render an interrogation custodial, and 'does not weigh
heavily in that analysis."'); United States v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1980) (questioning
of defendant by FBI agents at her home held non-custodial).
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the suspect is aware of the evidence against him and is aware that the inves-
tigation has in fact focused on him."'221 Such decisions apparently emanate
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Beckwith, which essen-
tially held that the mere fact that a law enforcement investigation has fo-
cused upon or targeted a specific subject does not make it presumptively
custodial for purposes of Miranda.
Likewise, in Stansbury v. California,222 the Supreme Court held that
"an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objec-
tive circumstances of an interrogation or the interview, and thus cannot af-
fect the Miranda custody inquiry." The Court further explained, however,
that
[a]n officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if
they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.
... Those beliefs are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a
reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned
would gauge the breadth of his or her "freedom of action."
223
Consistent with Stansbury, the officer's subjective intentions will
likely have a direct impact upon the totality of the circumstances and the
target's belief as to the custody issue. The officer's subjective intentions
might be conveyed, for instance, in and through the officer's mannerisms,
style of questioning, intensity of questioning, voice inflections, and the like.
In recognition of this fact, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that the "subjec-
tive intent of the interrogating officer" is a factor, which should at least be
considered in the "totality of the circumstances.,
224
When individuals are or may be targets, the interrogation will often
take on an inquisitorial tone and nature which will more likely than not be
225quietly-but objectively--conveyed to the target of the investigation.
Such inquisitorial interrogation at some point is conveyed by the officer's
words or deeds in such a manner that his "views or beliefs [are] somehow
manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected
221. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.
Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1979)).
222. 511 U.S. at 324.
223. Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
224. United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Rorex, 737 F.2d at
756); see also United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 1995) (justifying denial of
a motion to suppress because the defendant "was not the isolated target of any directed ques-
tioning").
225. Carter, 884 F.2d at 370 ("Although custody is not inferred from the mere circum-
stance that the police are questioning the one whom they believe to be guilty, the fact that the
individual has become the focus of the investigation is relevant 'to the extent that the suspect




how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom
to leave.,
226
4. Need or Justification for Interrogation and the Emphasis Placed
upon Interrogation when Executing the Search Warrant
Were there special circumstances which required an interrogation or
was the search warrant used as a mere pretext for interrogating employees
or occupants of the business? Did a primary purpose of the search appear to
be placing federal agents in a position so as to initiate surprise interviews
with targets, employees, and occupiers of a business in a police dominated
atmosphere? Did the federal agents only need five officers to implement the
search warrant and bring ten so that they would be able to interview indi-
viduals at the scene? Were officers assigned individuals to interrogate?
Were officers given questionnaires or suggested questions to ask? All of
these indicate that the officers were doing more than merely serving a
search warrant but, instead, were using the search warrant as a guise to en-
gage in interrogations of individuals.227
The purpose of an interrogation is a relevant factor in determining cus-
tody.228 With this in mind, the police cannot use an unconstitutional seizure
of a person in connection with a search warrant for the purpose of interro-
gating individuals:
for the statements given to police after an unlawful arrest to be admissi-
ble, the statement must not only be voluntary under Fifth Amendment
standards but must not be the result of an unconstitutional seizure. We
evaluate four factors to determine whether statements made to the police
after an illegal arrest are admissible: (1) whether the suspect has been
advised of his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement; (2) the tem-
poral proximity of his statements to his illegal seizure; (3) the existence
226. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at325.
227. But see United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1111-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (wherein
the Eighth Circuit, based upon the facts of that case, held that a search was not custodial
despite the use of a preprinted questionnaire which asked the defendant general questions
about her job duties and the company's billing practices).
228. See Satera, 933 F.2d at 646 (citing United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1320
(8th Cir. 1985)) (stating the relevant factors in determining whether an interrogation was
custodial include the "accused's freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place, and
length of interrogation") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hanson, 237 F.3d 961,
964 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that the factors in determining custody during interrogation
include "the place and purpose of the interrogation") (citing United States v. McKinney, 88
F.3d 551, 554 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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of intervening causes between the illegal arrest and the statements; and
(4) the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.
229
If a primary purpose of the execution of the search warrant is to inter-
rogate potential suspects and witnesses, this purpose is beyond the scope of
the search warrant and the detention of such individuals is an illegal seizure
to which the exclusionary rule should apply. This indicium should militate
in favor of a finding that the interrogation was custodial in nature to the
extent that it resembles deceptive law enforcement tactics tactfully designed
to coerce a confession or damaging admission.
VI. PRACTICE SUGGESTIONS
A. Preserving the Issue for Appeal
The issue presented in this article can be submitted to the federal dis-
trict court by filing a motion to suppress evidence gathered during an im-
proper law enforcement interrogation of the defendant conducted at the in-
dividual's place of employment (or elsewhere, as the facts may dictate).
One problem which may arise is that defense counsel might not even know
what the alleged statements are prior to the motion deadline or, sometimes,
prior to trial.230 Be forewarned that appellate courts have, more often than
not, affirmed district court decisions holding that insufficient "cause" ex-
isted to consider an untimely motion to suppress.23'
The reason why defense counsel might not be certain as to what, if
any, statements the federal government is contending a defendant made
during one of these custodial interrogations is because federal prosecutors
are typically required to produce very little information in criminal cases
(and some of the information that is provided may not be provided until
shortly before or at trial).232 However, upon request under Federal Rules
Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 16(a)(1)(A), prosecutors must disclose written
or recorded statements made by the defendant that are in the government's
229. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-04 (1975)).
230. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)-(c) (stating that motions to suppress evidence must be
timely filed on or before the date set by the court); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) (finding
that a failure to timely file a motion to suppress will result in a waiver; however, "the court
for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.")
231. See, e.g., United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979).
232. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 addresses the prosecution's and defendant's discovery obliga-
tions. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), and their progeny, generally govern the production of exculpatory evidence by the
-government to the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 govern issues with
respect to production of witness statements.
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possession, oral statements made by the defendant during a pre- or post-
arrest interview with a government agent, and testimony the defendant gave
at a grand jury proceeding that relates to the offense with which he has been
charged. Other information can be obtained under the other subsections of
FRCrP 1 6(a)(1) (although such a request triggers an often disadvantageous
reciprocal discovery obligation), but a FRCrP 16(a)(1)(A) request made
early in the proceeding will form the basis of any motion to suppress a de-
fendant's statements.
At least three motions should be filed in light of the scenario presented
in this article. The first is a limited Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) motion
seeking all exculpatory and inculpatory statements of the defendant. The
second is a motion to disclose certain evidence which would provide the
basis of a motion to suppress. The third is the actual motion to suppress.233
Of course, the motions should be submitted accompanied by briefs detailing
the relevant facts, applicable law, and authorities in support of the client's
position.
B. Common Suppression Hearing Issues
Upon the filing of a motion to suppress, the defendant will generally
receive a hearing pertaining to the issues raised in the motion.234 When the
motion pertains to whether or not a confession or other damaging statement
should be suppressed, the district court will decide whether the assertion of
the statements was made in violation of Miranda.235 Before rendering its
decision, the district court may receive testimony from the officers who
conducted the questioning, and perhaps from the defendant in the case, as to
what actually transpired during the exchange.
The defendant moving for an order seeking the suppression of evi-
dence has the general burden of proof.236 However, when the defendant has
made a prima facie showing that a statement may have been compelled in
violation of Miranda, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to estab-
lish that the statement was made voluntarily and not in violation of his
rights. The prosecution must meet its burden by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.237
233. Because of pretrial deadlines and the government's tardiness in failing to timely
respond to those motions, it may be necessary to file a motion to suppress before defense
counsel has determined whether any incriminating statements were actually made.
234. See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
235. See generally id.
236. United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1979).
237. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1972).
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Finally, it is important to remember that because consideration of the
motion to suppress essentially constitutes an evidentiary hearing triggering
FED. R. EVID. 104(a), the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) will typically
not be strictly observed.238 For instance, hearsay statements may be used in
determining whether or not a confession or seizure was illegally obtained.239
C. Appeal of a Denial or Grant of a Motion to Suppress
Defendants cannot pursue an immediate, interlocutory appeal from the
denial of a motion to suppress and may only appeal the issue after they have
been convicted.24 ° Conversely, the federal government enjoys a statutory
right pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 to appeal from a decisional order of a
district court suppressing evidence (or excluding evidence, or requiring a
return of seized property) in a criminal proceeding.24' The prerequisites for
such an appeal are that the defendant must not yet have been placed in jeop-
ardy, the United States Attorney must certify to the district court that the
appeal is not being pursued to delay the case, and the suppressed evidence
at issue constitutes substantial proof of a material fact.242 The appeal must
be taken within 30 days after the district court rendered its ruling.243
VII. CONCLUSION
The reality of the scenarios envisioned by this article is that individuals
present during the execution of search warrants for legitimate businesses are
typically "in custody" for an often extended period of time. As a part of law
enforcement investigative techniques, officers often take advantage of this
window of opportunity to conduct interviews of individuals who they might
not otherwise be able to interview (or at least not be able to interview as
"effectively"). The police dominated atmosphere is ideal for law enforce-
ment officers who desire to interview targets and material witnesses who are
likely to be in a confused or even panicked state, and are likely to be with-
out retained, much less present, legal counsel. It was this type of third de-
gree interrogation practice that concerned the Miranda Court:
'It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong .... It is
not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or
238. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In making its determination the court is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.").
239. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 175-76.
240. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962).
241. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in the Wallace case.




improper means.' Not only does the use of the third degree involve a fla-
grant violation of law by the officers of the law, but it involves also the
dangers of false confessions, and it tends to make police and prosecutors
less zealous in the search for objective evidence. . . . 'It is a short cut and
makes the police lazy and unenterprising.'
2
4
Although many of these interrogations are never brought to the atten-
tion of the court, they nonetheless constitute violations of the Bill of Rights.
Courts should recognize the reality of these custodial interrogations, con-
ducted without issuance of Miranda warnings, and (1) provide these persons
with the protections that the authors of the Bill of Rights intended them to
have and (2) further preclude Assistant United States Attorneys and federal
law enforcement authorities from abusing the limited authority vested in
them to conduct searches for items on the premises of legitimate businesses
245by also interrogating individuals present at the scene.
Perhaps the best argument against the improper custodial interroga-
tions which are the narrow focus of this article was set forth by the Eighth
Circuit in Griffin:
[T]he constant reluctance of law enforcement to advise suspects of their
rights is counterproductive to the fair administration of justice in a free
society. Effective law enforcement is not frustrated when police inform
suspects of their rights. Such practices protect the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system by assuring that convictions obtained by means of
confessions do not violate fundamental constitutional principles. The
contrary proposition, however, is true: Ignoring the requirements of
Miranda is ineffective law enforcement which produces convictions that
are ultimately reversed because agents of the law have not followed the
dictates of the law themselves.
246
We as a society, can do better.
244. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (quoting IV National Commission on
Law Observance XXXX).
245. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2001) (stating that the Citizens Protection Act, effective in
1999, provided that federal prosecutors are subject to the same extent to state laws and rules
and local federal court rules, governing lawyers in the State where the prosecutor engages in
the practice of law); States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]e
have long emphasized that a representative of the United States Government is held to a
higher standard of behavior"); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (finding that
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice and will be held to a higher standard of conduct than
other attorneys); United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that
prosecutors cannot utilize third parties [i.e., federal agents] to violate ethical rules governing
them); United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1987).
246. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1356 (1990) (citing Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990)).
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